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█ Abstract I’m going to generalize the points that L.A. Paul makes in her Transformative Experience and 
push them in a somewhat different direction. I will begin by talking about transformative experience in a 
generic sense and say how ubiquitous it is. Then I’ll distinguish that from the strict, specialized sense of 
transformative experience that Paul identifies. I will say why Paul’s focus on the strict and specialized 
sense allows her to arrive at a strong conclusion, but bypasses the more interesting lessons which concern 
the importance of de se imagination and the possibilities for educating it. 
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█ Riassunto Esperienza, trasformazione, immaginazione – Intendo generalizzare le questioni sollevate da 
L.A. Paul nel suo Trasformative Experience, spingendole in una direzione differente. Inizierò parlando 
dell’esperienza trasformativa in senso generico, illustrando quanto questa sia diffusa. Quindi distinguerò 
questo senso generico di esperienza trasformativa da quello più ristretto identificato da Paul. Illustrerò 
poi le ragioni per cui la messa a fuoco di questo senso ristretto e specifico da parte di Paul le consente di 
giungere a conclusioni forti, evitando però i compiti più interessanti che riguardano l’importanza 
dell’immaginazione de se e le possibilità di educarla. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Esperienza trasformativa; Laurie A. Paul; Immaginazione; Decisione 
 

 You live like this, sheltered, in a delicate world, and you be-
lieve you are living. Then you read a book… or you take a 
trip… and you discover that you are not living, that you are 
hibernating. The symptoms of hibernating are easily detecta-
ble: first, restlessness. The second symptom (when hibernating 
becomes dangerous and might degenerate into death): ab-
sence of pleasure. That is all. It appears like an innocuous ill-
ness. Monotony, boredom, death. Millions live like this (or die 
like this) without knowing it. They work in offices. They drive 
a car. They picnic with their families. They raise children. And 
then some shock treatment takes place, a person, a book, a 
song, and it awakens them and saves them from death. 
  
 Anaïs Nin, The Diary of Anais Nin, vol. 1: 1931-34 
I’m delighted and honored for the oppor-
tunity to write about Paul’s remarkable book. 
It is close to the perfect philosophy book: tight, 
clean, clear, and it puts a spotlight on some-
thing that is worth thinking about from a 
number of perspectives. It raises questions of 
interest across the disciplines and central to 
human life. 
I’m going to generalize the points that she 
makes and push them in a somewhat different 
direction. I will begin by talking about trans-
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formative experience in a generic sense and say 
how ubiquitous it is. Then I’ll distinguish that 
from the strict, specialized sense of transform-
ative experience that Paul identifies. I will say 
why Paul’s focus on the strict and specialized 
sense allows her to arrive at a strong conclu-
sion, but bypasses the more interesting lessons 
which concern the importance of de se imagi-
nation and the possibilities for educating it. 
Paul writes: 
 
An epistemically transformative experience 
is an experience that teaches you something 
you could not have learned without having 
that kind of experience. Having that expe-
rience gives you new abilities to imagine, 
recognize, and cognitively model possible 
future experiences of that kind. A personal-
ly transformative experience changes you in 
some deep and personally fundamental 
way, for example, by changing your core 
personal preferences or by changing the 
way you understand your desires and the 
kind of person you take yourself to be. A 
transformative experience, then, is an expe-
rience that is both epistemically and per-
sonally transformative. Transformative 
choices and transformative decisions are 
choices and decisions that centrally involve 
transformative experiences. [Personally 
Transformative Experiences] are those that 
lead you to change what you value and to 
what extent.1 
 
She observes that when we see how epis-
temic and personal transformations work, it 
becomes apparent that many of life’s biggest 
decisions can involve choices to have experi-
ences that teach us things we cannot first-
personally know about from any other source 
but the experience itself. She continues: 
 
If the salient details of the nature of the 
transformative experience of producing 
and becoming cognitively and emotionally 
attached to your first child are epistemically 
inaccessible to you before you undergo the 
experience, then you cannot, from your 
first personal perspective, forecast the first-
personal nature of the preference changes you 
may undergo, at least not in the relevant 
way. If so, the choice to have a child asks 
you to make a decision where you must 
choose between earlier and later selves at 
different times, with different sets of pref-
erences, but where the earlier self lacks cru-
cial information about the preferences and 
perspectives of the possible later selves, and 
thus cannot foresee, in the relevant first-
personal sense, the self she is making her-
self into.2 
 
And she argues that this compromises the 
ability to make life choices in a manner that is 
both rational and authentic. 
 
█  The ubiquity of Transformative Experi-
ence in a generic sense 
 
Paul thinks that the ability to make choices 
at once rationally and authentically is com-
promised by the epistemic challenge of know-
ing what it is like to be that person in cases of 
transformative experience because the choice 
changes you in ways that are beyond your ken. 
Sometimes Paul speaks as though she is criti-
cizing a particular conception of decision-
theoretic rationality, and sometimes as though 
she accepts it as a characterization of what ra-
tional decision should look like, treating the 
epistemic problem presented by transforma-
tive experience as a lamentable difficulty with 
implementing it.  
But anyone who has lived knows that un-
certainty and the expectation of transfor-
mation are part and parcel of living a life for 
reasons that are entirely independent of the 
considerations Paul raises. Life is full of uncer-
tainty of precisely the kind that means you 
can’t control what experiences you have and 
how they will change you. Every single mo-
ment in your life is full of chance encounters 
that change your life in ways that you couldn’t 
have anticipated in advance: The book you lift 
of the shelf while idly waiting for your mother 
in a grocery store at thirteen will change your 
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world. You choose a job, paying attention to 
the weather and the salary that will take you to 
a city where you find a new calling. Unex-
pected contingencies are part of the quotidian 
business of living and transform you in ways 
that couldn’t be anticipated. You meet a man 
in a taxi in Chicago who later kisses you while 
explaining that he is moving to Australia. You 
kiss him back laughing, knowing you won’t see 
him again. But you will move with him, you 
will learn to surf together, and your twins will 
have his eyes. You follow a friend who has 
Parkinson’s to a yoga class to lend support, five 
years into your dream job at the CIA and three 
months later you know you are biding your 
time there until you can afford your own yoga 
studio. 
If by transformative experience, one means 
“experiences that change you in ways that you 
can’t predict in advance” transformative expe-
rience is the norm, not the exception. Your as-
sumptions about what you will like, who you 
will be, and what you will care about a year 
from now, or two years, or three, particularly 
when you are young, are hostage to things that 
you couldn’t possibly know in advance and 
shouldn’t be shy of embracing. The lion’s share 
of uncertainty comes from the fact that the 
things that change us are the noisy contingen-
cies that come from outside our field of view 
when we are making a choice: the things that 
are selected, but not selected for.3 If you look 
back at the truly transformative episodes in 
your life, I suspect that none of them (perhaps 
aside from having children) satisfied Paul’s 
characterization of transformative experience. 
If being rational in decision means an under-
standing in advance of who you will become as 
a result of choices you make, life is almost nev-
er rational.  
I do not myself feel inclined to say that this 
is a lamentable fact we have to live with. It is 
hard to take seriously a model of rationality 
that says that we can’t make a choice rationally 
if it will change us in ways that we can’t know 
in advance. Living should be about transfor-
mation and genuine transformation involves 
uncertainty. 
This isn’t a new thought. Dan Russell, writ-
ing about what it is to aspire to virtue in an Ar-
istotelian sense, says something very like this. 
He writes: 
 
The choices that do most to enrich our lives 
are not choices of means to the ends we al-
ready know we have. They are rather … the 
choices through which we come to discover 
new ends we might pursue … we choose a 
career, or move to a new city, or meet a new 
person, not to become the persons we al-
ready knew we wanted to be, but to discov-
er what persons we might become for hav-
ing made those choices.4 
 
I think he is exactly right here. Transfor-
mation according to plan is a shallow type of 
transformation, one that precludes evaluative 
learning. Paul says that there is no way of mak-
ing a personally transformative choice authen-
tically if you don’t know in advance what you 
will become as a result. On the contrary, I 
think that remaining open to transformation 
of all kinds at every stage isn’t a problem for 
living authentically. It is what living authenti-
cally is. To enter a marriage or a new job in 
good faith is expecting and being willing to be 
transformed in ways you don’t anticipate. 
Paul says that there is no way of making a 
personally transformative choice authentically 
because she thinks that in order for it to be au-
thentic, the choice has to flow from you. But 
that is not quite the right way to interpret au-
thenticity, if she means it the way Sartre or de 
Beauvoir did. Authenticity for them meant 
your actions should flow from you rather than 
from misguided ideas about duty or the obliga-
tions that other people try to impose on you, or 
by internal, self-undermining cancers like as 
appetite, addiction, or infatuation. It means 
that we should choose our lives on our own 
terms. Max Stirner used the word Eigenheit – 
“owning oneself” – which captures it quite 
well. 
It doesn’t mean that choices have to be ra-
tionally determined by a fixed character from 
which action flows. That idea goes radically 
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against everything that Sartre thought about 
the human being. And the idea that it should 
be rationally determined by your current val-
ues doesn’t strike me as too much of a far cry 
from that. At every moment, you create 
yourself, and the creation is radically free and 
radically new. The fact that your choices are 
not rationally determined by the values that 
you had in place in advance seems entirely in 
keeping with an existentialist conception of 
authenticity. 
 
█  The rarity of Transformative Experience 
on the Black-and-White Mary model 
  
Suppose you agree that if “experience” just 
means the gestalt what-it’s-like for a particular 
person in a particular situation at a particular 
time, transformative experience is utterly 
ubiquitous. Everything that happens to you, 
and even simple reflection without any out-
ward happening produces complex, holistic 
changes – changes in values, preferences, and 
utilities – whose effects cannot be generally 
known in advance. The dynamics that governs 
those inner changes has all the hallmarks of 
complexity: there are feedback loops, strong 
coupling among components, and non-linearity. 
The radicalness of the inner change is not in 
direct proportion to the novelty of the experi-
ence. 
Some of Paul’s discussion (particularly in 
connection with having a baby) suggests that 
this is what she has in mind. But in other plac-
es, she is quite explicit that she has something 
much more specific and esoteric in mind. The 
official definition of a Transformative Experi-
ence is: an experience that teaches you some-
thing you could not have learned without hav-
ing that kind of experience. She gives other ex-
amples: tasting vegemite, becoming a vampire, 
choosing to have a retinal operation that will 
give you sight after living to adulthood as a 
blind person. These are supposed to be «struc-
turally parallel to a version of Frank Jackson’s 
case of Mary growing up in a black and white 
room».5 What is characteristic of Transforma-
tive Experiences as a class is that, in her words, 
«you can’t know what it will be like to have 
the characterizing experience before you have 
it, and if you choose to have it, it will change 
you significantly and irreversibly».6 So these 
are new types of experience that are epistemi-
cally impenetrable in a particularly acute sense: 
you can’t know what they are like without hav-
ing them. And if we take the model of Black 
and White Mary seriously, having them re-
solves any epistemic uncertainty. Let’s call this 
the Black-and-White-Mary model of Trans-
formative Experience. 
She focuses on these cases, I suspect, be-
cause at least in the book she seems primarily 
interested in the difficulty that the epistemic 
problem poses to rational decision. There is an 
interesting and well-developed discussion of 
the character of that epistemic difficulty in the 
literature on phenomenal consciousness that 
argues that the epistemic difficulty is absolute 
and insurmountable. So she can use the Black-
and-White-Mary model of Transformative 
Experience to say that there is a deep and in-
surmountable problem with making the most 
important choices that we make in our lives. It 
was a very interesting philosophical move to 
link those two literatures, and they make the 
structure of the problem very clear. But it leads 
her to look to decision rules like “seek new ex-
periences” to resolve the decision dilemma. 
One might wonder why this should constitute 
a rational response and she misses what is to 
my mind a much more interesting discussion. 
By focusing on cases in which – by her 
lights – the epistemic difficulty is absolute and 
insurmountable, she suppresses any discussion 
of the capacity to imagine what it would be 
like from a first-personal perspective to do 
things that you haven’t done, to be in situa-
tions that you haven’t been in, to understand 
how new experiences may change and shape 
you, or to get a sense of what it would be like 
to walk in different shoes not for a day or a 
week, but for a year or a life. Those are ques-
tions we face every day and few of them have 
the structure of a Black-and-White Mary ex-
ample. 
And that means she sidesteps what I think 
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are the really important questions raised by 
her book. We are always making choices – 
big and small – that call on us to imagine 
what it would be like, from a first personal 
perspective, to do something we haven’t 
done. What would it be like to visit Sweden 
in February, or Costa Rica in the rainy sea-
son? What would it be like to give a talk to a 
physics department or let our hair go grey? In 
high stakes cases, we need to understand 
what it would be to live a life different from 
our present life and the challenge is to try to 
imagine it from the inside. If I’m choosing 
between living in Tucson and living in New 
York, for example, or getting married or not 
getting married, the actual mechanics of 
thinking that through are very different from 
anything that is helpfully thought of on the 
model of tasting vegemite or becoming a 
vampire. It is not a total black box, and it 
doesn’t seem to conform to the Black-and-
White Mary model. 
 
█  The great grey area in between 
 
The literature on Paul’s book has tacitly 
recognized this by moving away from the 
Black-and-White Mary model of transforma-
tive experience to something more complex 
and subtle and with a much more interesting 
epistemology. So let me back up and say a cou-
ple of words about experience. The quality of 
your life in a sense that is directly phenomeno-
logical and matters most when you have a dif-
ficult life decision to make doesn’t depend on 
new types of experience of the sort involved in 
basic unstructured qualia like tasting vegemite. 
It involves something with internal complexi-
ty, and emotional content, and a much richer 
sense of qualitative character that captures the 
lived sense of what it is like to be someone oth-
er than who you are now. The case of having 
your first child is much closer to the sort of 
rich phenomenological character I have in 
mind, but there too, Paul emphasizes the in-
surmountability of the imaginative barrier be-
cause of the physical changes that come with 
becoming a mother, which she thinks puts 
genuinely “knowing what it would be like” be-
yond the ken of someone who has not had the 
experience. She writes: 
 
Having a child often results in the trans-
formative experience of gestating, produc-
ing, and becoming attached to your own 
child. At least in the ordinary case, if you 
are a woman who has a child, you go 
through a distinctive and unique experience 
when growing, carrying and giving birth to 
the child, and in the process you form a 
particular, distinctive and unique attach-
ment to the actual newborn you produce.7 
 
Understanding Transformative Experience 
on the Black-and-White Mary model means 
that the ignorance is remediable only by hav-
ing the experience. It is important for Paul’s 
purposes that it is so, because that is what al-
lows her to say that there is an insurmountable 
epistemic deficit that makes rational decision 
impossible. 
But when one widens one’s notion of expe-
rience to the rich phenomenology invoked 
above, it becomes clear that the phenomenon 
of not knowing what it will be like if you 
choose a certain path in life, is much more 
ubiquitous and, much more a matter of degree, 
than these cases suggest. And the wider class is 
not helpfully illuminated by simple kinds of 
qualitatively new basic experiences like tasting 
vegemite, nor is it illuminated by totally alien 
experiences like becoming a vampire. Once it 
is brought into focus, it becomes clear that the 
relationship between first-personal imagina-
tion and experience is more complicated, 
equivocal, and interesting than the assimila-
tion to the Black-and-White Mary model sug-
gests. And it becomes clear that we are always 
having new experiences that change us in ways 
that are relevant to what our lives are like for 
us. 
I’m not the first to say these kinds of thing 
in response to Paul’s book,8 and a lot of her 
own discussion of examples like having your 
first child invokes this much richer sense of 
knowing what it is like.  But the official defini-
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tion of the class of Transformative Experiences 
(and the one that plays an important role in 
the discussion of decision theory) remains that 
they involve an epistemic deficit that can be 
overcome in no other way than by having the 
experience. 
This matters a lot to the kinds of lessons 
that one draws.  If we are trying to capture 
what actually what matters when one is try-
ing to imagine in a first personal way the in-
ternal quality of a life, we need something 
that includes emotional phenomenology, pat-
terns of response, and the historically shaped 
lenses through which one sees the world.  
These color every aspect of the lived quality 
of one’s life.  Experience in this rich sense has 
cognitive depth (layers of content, built up 
over time) and a profoundly path-dependent 
character.  When it comes to the rich sense of 
knowing what it is like to be someone who 
has had experiences different from your own, 
the epistemic difficulty is there.  But it is nei-
ther absolute, nor insurmountable, and over-
coming it is not (in practical terms) a matter 
of having the experience but – at least in part 
– of imagination. By focusing on the Black-
and-White Mary model of transformative 
experience, Paul passes over the philosophi-
cally important discussion that occurs in the 
more vast and interesting area between inac-
cessibility and ease of possession, where the 
imagination works – and works hard – to at-
tain first-personal understanding. 
 
█  De se imagination 
 
People use the word “imagination” in many 
ways. There is debate about what imagination 
is, whether it is a form of knowledge, whether 
it is a single mental capacity, or a family of re-
lated capacities. I don’t want to prejudge any 
of those questions. I mean “imagination” here 
in the specific sense of being able to imagine 
from a first-person perspective what it is like 
to be someone different than who you are now. 
What we are interested in is de se imagination 
of a kind that involves imagining from a first 
personal perspective being on the other side of 
experiences different than those you have had. 
We all have an imagination fed by a certain 
– inevitably restricted – diet of basic experi-
ence, and we have to form some idea of what it 
would be like to be someone different from 
ourselves. The ability to imagine what it is like 
to be someone different from you – i.e. some-
one who has been changed and shaped by ex-
periences of a kind that you have not had – is 
important, moreover, well beyond its role in 
decision. It matters not just because we are 
faced with choices about who to become. It 
matters because we are faced with other peo-
ple, who have had experiences very different 
from ours, and we are interested in who they 
are; what it is like to be them; what it is like for 
them from the inside. 
Imagination of the specific de se type in 
question matters in human relationships of all 
kinds. It matters for morality, for fairness, for 
insight or comprehension. It deepens your un-
derstanding of the people around you and 
makes you better able to be a good friend, a 
generous helper, a wiser parent, a supportive 
partner. This is obvious when you are dealing 
with someone you love, but almost any social 
exchange demands some form of it. To inter-
act with anyone as a human being, you need to 
understand a little bit about what things are 
like for him or her. This means not just know-
ing how the room looks from where they are 
standing, but also knowing how the situation 
seems to them in socially significant ways. You 
need to appreciate something about where 
they come from and who they are, because you 
need to know whether they might be disadvan-
taged or vulnerable in the situation, whether 
they might feel wronged, or grateful, or insult-
ed or rewarded by how you behave. This 
chasm of (mis)-understanding was so painfully 
on display recently in the hearing surrounding 
the nomination of Brent Kavanaugh for the US 
Supreme Court. The hearing, which was 
broadcast nationally and seen by more than 20 
million, included testimony from Christine 
Blasey Ford who described an assault by a 
drunken Kavanaugh 30 years earlier in which 
he pinned her to a bed, tried to tear off her 
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clothes, and put his hand over her mouth to 
muffle her cries for help.9 It was clear that 
women listening to her testimony understood 
something that very few men seemed to appre-
ciate.  Men seemed to think that even putting 
aside any dispute about the facts, the assault 
wasn’t that a big deal. People drink. Things get 
out of hand. She might have been scared but 
didn’t get hurt. In their imagination, the whole 
thing amounted to a couple of inconsequential 
minutes when she was fifteen. Women under-
stand that it was something altogether differ-
ent: something much more horrifying, some-
thing to do with powerlessness and a loss of 
innocence, something about being taught your 
place in the world that comes with its own pe-
culiar mixture of rage and humiliation. Wom-
en understand why we keep these things secret. 
Men do not. 
If one is trying to understand something 
as complicated as the experience of being a 
woman, or being, for example, a black person 
in America, the challenge is not just to imag-
ine what it would be like see something dif-
ferent in the mirror, or even to produce so-
cial reactions different from those you are 
accustomed to. The challenge is to imagine 
what it would be like to have emotions and 
beliefs that were the product of a history of 
experiences that are shaped by being these 
things. That goes back to the point about the 
path-dependent character of the phenome-
nology. A day outside the context of the life 
in which it occurs is like a note outside the 
context of the melody. It doesn’t have the 
same quality. 
 
█  Educating the imagination 
 
If there really were no way of knowing what 
it is like to be someone different from you, ex-
cept to go through the experiences they’ve had, 
things would be rather dire. But of course, it’s 
not like that. The imagination can be educat-
ed, and the circle of experience can be wid-
ened, in ways that don’t just depend on having 
the experience oneself. None of us is in fact 
confined to our own experience. 
When you go through things with the peo-
ple you are close to – e.g., when you live 
through the illness of a friend with cancer, or 
you live through the aging of parents – you live 
through it not just from your perspective, but 
also from theirs. Books can also play an im-
portant role. The English novel, perhaps more 
than any other artistic form, allows one to take 
a deep dive into the lived experience of other 
human beings from the inside. This can give 
you psychological insight not just into other 
people, but also into yourself. It can make you 
better at recognizing your own emotions and 
articulating them to others. It can also open up 
the imagination to ways of being far outside 
the range of one’s experience. Why do we 
think that people in a bad situation (for exam-
ple, immigrants or refugees) always want their 
children to get a good education? They see it as 
their ticket out not just because they think it 
will help them get a good job, but because it 
will help them see a life beyond their situation, 
recognize opportunities, create a life for them-
selves different from the experience of their 
parents. They know something that those of us 
who have started treating universities as pro-
fessional training have forgotten: viz., that a 
strong and healthy imagination, nourished by a 
rich array of real and imagined people and 
worlds, is the best thing that you can equip 
your child with. 
There is a huge variety of ways in which 
people educate the imagination, of course:  
travel, novels, seeking out not just new friends, 
but new types of friends. This kind of educa-
tion is never finished and there is no single way 
to achieve it. Nor is it easy to really know what 
things are like for people different from your-
self. One of the things that you learn in life is 
that your assumptions about the inner lives of 
others are often way off. Many people you 
think have it easy do not. Many people who 
seem to be gliding right along have suffered 
and are suffering. People who you knew when 
they were young and hip, and who now appear 
to be old and sad – saddled down with kids 
and jobs and houses – are happier than they 
have ever been. 
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As hard as it is to get right, the need to ex-
ercise de se imagination is unavoidable. The 
better you get at it, the better decisions you 
will make for yourself and the better equipped 
you will be to understand other people. The 
pop psychology catch word for this kind of 
thing is emotional intelligence. It is indifferent 
to whether it is self- or other- directed.10 
I’ve never understood why the imagination 
– this specific type of imagination; imagining 
what it is like to be a person with a different 
history of experience – is not more central in 
discussions of moral psychology.11 
 
█  Conclusion 
 
In sum, then, I think the book is fascinat-
ing, but Paul’s focus on the Black-and-White-
Mary model of transformative experience 
was unfortunate. It made the central argu-
ment analytically clearer, but at the expense 
of steering past a deeply important philo-
sophical discussion which is sitting right be-
side the questions she raises. The need to ed-
ucate and to strengthen the imagination – in 
the specific sense of being able to imagine 
what it is like to be someone different from 
who you are now, someone shaped by experi-
ences that you have not had – is important in 
ways that go well beyond helping you know 
whether you’d be happy in this life rather 
than that one. I hope others take up that dis-
cussion.  
 
█  Notes 
 
1 L.A. PAUL, Précis of Transformative Experience, in: 
«Philosophy and Phenomenological Research», 
vol. XCI, n. 3, 2015, pp. 760-765, here p. 761. 
2 Ivi, p. 765 - emphasis mine. 
3 That is not to say you don’t have some control, 
but the idea that you control your life in a way 
that is at least suggested by the picture of deci-
sion-theoretic rationality – where you have beliefs 
about the world, you imagine what different fu-
tures are like, and choose the one with the highest 
expected utility – is completely unrealistic. Lots of 
things will happen to you that you didn’t choose, 
and it is hard to know what you will become. The 
 
 
hours reading poetry, the failures and the small 
humiliations, the people that hated you, you don’t 
know why, and the unexpected peace you find 
when you are in a desert; These things are your 
becoming. It will all add up to something, but you 
can’t know what in advance. 
4 D. RUSSELL, Virtuously Aspiring to Virtue, manu-
script. 
5 Frank Jackson introduced a Black and White 
Mary, of course, in F. JACKSON, Epiphenomenal 
Qualia, in: «Philosophical Quarterly», vol. 
XXXII, n. 127, 1982, pp. 127-136. See also, F. 
JACKSON, What Mary Didn’t Know, in: «The Jour-
nal of Philosophy», vol. LXXXIII, n. 5, 1986, pp. 
291-295. The argument involves a thought exper-
iment that is almost universally regarded as estab-
lishing that there are certain kinds of knowledge – 
viz., knowledge of phenomenal properties – that 
can only be gained through experience.  Mary is a 
fictional neuroscientist who «for whatever reason, 
forced to investigate the world from a black and 
white room via a black and white television moni-
tor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision 
and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical infor-
mation there is to obtain about what goes on when 
we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 
“red”, “blue”, and so on. She discovers, for example, 
just which wavelength combinations from the sky 
stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces 
via the central nervous system the contraction of 
the vocal cords and expulsion of air from the lungs 
that results in the uttering of the sentence “The sky 
is blue”» (F. JACKSON, Epiphenomenal Qualia, cit., 
p. 127). The claim is that she will learn something 
new – viz., what blue looks like – when sees blue 
for the first time. 
6 L.A. PAUL, Précis of Transformative Experience, 
cit., p. 764. 
7 Ibidem. 
8 See, for example, R. CHANG, Transformative 
Choices, in: «Res Philosophica», vol. XCII, n. 2, 
2015, pp. 237-282; E. BARNES, What You Can Ex-
pect When You Don’t Want to be Expecting, in: 
«Philosophy and Phenomenological Research», 
vol. XCI, n. 3, 2015, pp. 775-786; J. CAMPBELL, L.A. 
Paul’s “Transformative Experience”, in: «Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research», vol. XCI, n. 
3, 2015, pp. 787-793. 
9 Kavanaugh denied the allegations. The disa-
greement I’m pointing to is not a disagreement 
about what happened, but a disagreement about 
how much it mattered. 
 




10 The claim is nothing as simple as that reading 
will make bad people good. It is that it will make 
good people better at being good. It can also make 
bad ones better at being bad. If de se imagination 
can make you more sensitive, more attuned to the 
difference and complexity, better at recognizing 
what is going on in someone else, it can also make 
you a better manipulator, a cannier liar, and an 
all-around knave. What makes Iago bad is his ma-
lign intentions. What makes him dangerous is his 
psychological insight. But the link between moral-
ity and de se imagination is more complex than 
this suggests. Our failures to be good are often 
failures of the imagination in a way that makes us 
culpable. Part of what we owe others is to recog-
nize their perspective, and that imposes the re-
sponsibility to try to understand it. 
11 The call to move morality away from rationality 
and towards imagination is one that Iris Murdoch 
made long ago. She used the word “perception” 
rather than imagination to emphasize that it can 
give rise to real knowledge. She writes: «I would 
suggest that, at the level of serious common sense 
and of an ordinary non-philosophical reflection 






























that goodness is connected with knowledge; not 
with impersonal quasi-scientific knowledge of the 
ordinary world, whatever that may be, but with a 
refined and honest perception of what is really 
the case, a patient and just discernment and ex-
ploration of what confronts one, which is the re-
sult not simply of opening one’s eyes but of a cer-
tain and perfectly familiar kind of moral disci-
pline» (I. MURDOCH, Metaphysics as a Guide to 
Morals, Penguin, New York 1993, p. 330). The 
famous example she gives involves exercise of 
moral imagination.  It involves a mother who be-
gins with an unsympathetic and self-serving view 
of her son's fiancé, seeing the young woman as 
undignified and uncouth, not worthy of her son’s 
affection.  By forcing herself to look at the girl not 
through the lenses of her own social values and dis-
appointed expectations, but through other lenses 
(those not organized around self-centered con-
cerns, but framed – as Murdoch might put it – by 
love) she opens herself up to seeing the girl’s fresh-
ness and spontaneity and undergoes a transfor-
mation of vision that ends by recognizing her sim-
plicity and goodness (I. MURDOCH, The Sovereignty 
of Good, Routledge, London/New York 1970).  
 
